

# **DDR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN OVERVIEW**

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## 1. TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BCPR	The Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery
CAFF	Children associated with fighting forces
CAR	Central African Republic
ComRec	The Community Recovery and Reintegration Project (UNDP)
CONADER	Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et Réintégration
CRC	Centre Résolution Conflits
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DR	Demobilisation and reintegration
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
EXCs	Ex-combatants
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FQEI	Facility for Quality Enhancement and Innovation
GoDRC	Government, Democratic Republic of Congo
IDA	International Development Association
IDPs	Internally displaced people
IFESH	The International Foundation for Education and Self-Help
IRC	The International Rescue Committee
KT	Katanga Province, Democratic Republic of Congo
MA	Maniema Province, Democratic Republic of Congo
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NK	North Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo
OR	Orientale Province, Democratic Republic of Congo
OVC	Other vulnerable children
PNDDR	Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion
RoC	Republic of Congo
RRM	The Rapid Reaction Mechanism Project (UNDP)
SC-UK	Save the Children UK
SK	South Kivu Province, Democratic Republic of Congo
TDRP	The Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
UEPNDDR	Unité d'Exécution du Projet National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion

Please note: in this report, text shown in italics is normally a direct quotation or extract from the source that is referenced.

## 2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which were carried out under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) between 2002 and 2009. This information will help Peace Direct to establish the comparative effectiveness of the DDR programmes of its partner organisations in DRC, especially the DDR efforts of the Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC).

## 3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although the MDRP successfully demobilised around 300,000 ex-combatants (EXCs), the results vary drastically from country to country. In DRC around 102,000 EXCs were demobilised: however, reintegration efforts were much less successful (only 58% were reintegrated). Furthermore, there were major capability problems with regard to programme implementation, and the government-led DDR programme was particularly ineffective. In addition, parts of DRC's government did not support the MDRP and managed to disrupt and delay the DDR effort. Corruption was also a major issue.

The performance of the international implementing partners varied significantly. While organisations such as Save the Children UK successfully reintegrated more than 3,000 child soldiers, others like UNDP struggled to meet their targets (UNDP placed only 83 ex-combatants out of a target of 10,000 in reintegration projects) and were slow to respond.

## 4. INTRODUCTION

The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) was a regional framework to support the DDR of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes Region of Africa. Arguably, it was by far the largest DDR programme in the world, in terms of number of states involved, individuals demobilised and levels of funding.

MDRP was set up in 2002 and closed in June 2009. About a dozen donors and the World Bank provided over USD 450 million, which financed the successful demobilisation of around 300,000 ex-combatants.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, seven countries had been involved in a regional conflict mainly played out on the territory of DRC. All of these countries, namely Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo (RoC), DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, participated in the programme.<sup>1</sup>

The following section will give a brief overview over the MDRP, with the focus on overall programme achievements in DRC. Section 5 will look at individual DDR programmes/projects in DRC that were carried out under the umbrella of the MDRP by different organisations, and assess their outcomes and effectiveness. Section 6 will provide some information on the successor programme of the MDRP.

## 5. THE MULTI-COUNTRY DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME

### 5.1 Programme overview

#### 5.1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the programme, according to the World Bank's *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration* in March 2002, was:

*To enhance the prospects for stabilisation and recovery in the region. The strategy's main premise is that the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants is necessary to establishing peace and restoring security, which are in turn pre-conditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.*<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank, *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report*, Overview of the Program Achievements, July 2010,

<sup>2</sup> World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 25, 2002, piii.

### 5.1.2 Objectives

The *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration* defines the programme objectives as:

- (i) *To provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts for both government and irregular forces;*
- (ii) *To establish a single mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilisation; and*
- (iii) *To serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DRPs).*<sup>3</sup>

### 5.1.3 Design

The MDRP was a unique programme in its design, as it was based on the premise that no ‘single donor or agency can address the complexity of DDR issues in the region’, and therefore opted for a partnership of national governments, donor countries, UN agencies, the World Bank and local implementers, which had a regional approach yet was based on national ownership.<sup>4</sup>

- Partnership: It was recognised that a successful DDR strategy required a range of activities that no single actor would be able to provide, so different actors combined their capabilities and resources.
- Regional approach: It was understood that the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region were mainly trans-border disputes, so a regional approach to dealing with DDR issues was seen as necessary.
- National ownership: MDRP started from the assumption that for DDR activities to be successful and sustainable, national actors must define and take responsibility for the DDR activities in their respective countries. In practice, national actors were defined as the governments of the participating countries.<sup>5</sup>

### 5.1.4 Finance

The original costs estimated in the MDRP Strategy were USD 500 million. The donor community was to provide USD 350 million, via a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) which would be established as part of MDRP and administered by the World Bank, and the International Development Association (IDA) would contribute the remaining USD 150 million. Funds would be allocated to one of four activities: (i) national programmes, (ii) special projects, (iii) regional activities, and (iv) programme management.<sup>6</sup>

### 5.1.5 DDR strategy

The *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration* defines a DDR best-practice strategy designed to reflect the lessons learnt from previous DDR activities in Africa and elsewhere. It addresses the following DDR phases:

- Disarmament  
*Disarmament of ex-combatants should be a distinct phase without directly associated benefits to avoid giving the impression that a DRP is a weapons buy-back program that rewards ex-combatants for handing over weapons. Disarmament refers to the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons. Experience suggests that the quality and caliber of the weapons improves as disarmament proceeds and mutual trust and confidence are gradually built. Ideally, arms should be destroyed as soon as possible after they are collected, but the government involved may choose to retain some of the weapons. The best confidence-building measure for disarmament is a manifestly fair process, well planned and executed with transparent monitoring and verification.*

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<sup>3</sup> World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 25, 2002, p1-2.

<sup>4</sup> World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 25, 2002, piii.

<sup>5</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p9.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 25, 2002, p 22.

- Demobilisation

*This phase is short but logistically complex. The successful implementation of demobilisation activities is a precondition for the subsequent provision of targeted reinsertion and reintegration assistance. Key demobilisation activities include the distribution of non-transferable ID cards, the collection of socioeconomic data and the establishment of a database on the beneficiary population. Furthermore, the assembly of ex-combatants during the demobilisation phase provides a good opportunity for health counselling and HIV/AIDS education and voluntary testing, as well as the dissemination of information about programme benefits and civilian life. Particular attention needs to be paid to clear eligibility criteria and screening processes to avoid targeting errors.*

- Reinsertion

*Upon demobilisation, the ex-combatants lose their source of (formal or informal) income. Experience indicates that they are usually in a vulnerable financial situation until they can generate income. During this period (the “reinsertion” phase), ex-combatants require a transitional safety net to cover their families’ basic material needs.*

*The objective of this transitional assistance would be to enable the ex-combatants to return to their community and to sustain themselves and their families for a limited period immediately following demobilisation. Lessons from previous programmes suggest that cash assistance is often preferable to in-kind support, as it maximises beneficiary choice and reduces administrative costs.*

*Mindful of the possible leakages that can undermine cash payment systems, DRPs have instituted a number of safeguards in relation to reinsertion benefits payments. These include making payments to ex-combatants only in their region of return (and not at the time of demobilisation), developing a robust ID system that is difficult to forge and can accommodate digital pictures in a master database, installing a management information system that links payments to the ID database, and verifying eligibility for both reinsertion payments and reintegration assistance through this database. Experience has shown that if a sufficiently robust management information system linked to the demobilisation ID system is established for the programme then leakages in cash payments can be kept at a minimal level.*

- Economic reintegration

*Ex-combatants are often a high-risk group due to their familiarity with weapons and violence. Where this is the case, targeted support is advisable to help them establish sustainable livelihoods. In order to be relevant and cost-effective, such assistance should be tailored to their socioeconomic profile and adjusted to the economic environment. Female ex-combatants often require customised support to establish sustainable livelihoods.*

*In general, ex-combatants should receive no more support than is necessary to help them attain the general standard of living of the communities into which they reintegrate. Furthermore, reintegration assistance should be limited in time to avoid the creation of a dependency syndrome. Information, counselling and referral services can assist ex-combatants to assess their livelihood options and find employment. Apprenticeships in the informal sector combine the benefits of vocational training and employment and are thus preferable to training only. Micro-projects can help ex-combatants secure their economic independence and self-employment. They are, however, also complex interventions that require significant administrative capacity and a stable market environment.*

*Ultimately, ex-combatants are reintegrated into a broader economic context. The creation of viable long-term employment opportunities for ex-combatants is closely linked to private sector growth and associated employment generation. It should be noted that ex-combatants themselves can provide a significant human resource contribution to the civilian economy.*

- Social reintegration

*Social reintegration is often eased by the support of an extended family network. Therefore, ex-combatants should be encouraged to reintegrate in the vicinity of their extended families. Informal networks of ex-combatants – discussion groups, ex-combatants associations, joint economic ventures – are important elements to successful economic and social reintegration. Efforts to structure assistance to ex-combatants such that communities of return benefit can offer incentives for collaboration and acceptance, thereby strengthening social capital. Care*

*should be taken to prevent the stigmatisation of ex-combatants as unfit for military service or as conveyors of disease and violence. Community sensitisation and information efforts are paramount in this regard. The fears of communities related to the return of ex-combatants should also be addressed.*

- Institutional issues

*Programme coordination by one civilian agency with overall programme responsibility, balanced by decentralisation of implementation to regions and communities makes for a powerful institutional arrangement. Where possible, existing implementation capacities should be leveraged. The employment of ex-combatants as counsellors and field staff can facilitate reintegration.<sup>7</sup>*

## **5.2 MDRP overall programme results**

### **5.2.1 Funding**

MDRP financed five national programmes, 11 special projects and three MDRP-related projects in the seven participating countries, at a total cost of USD 451 million. USD 260 million came from donors through the MDFT, and USD 191 million from the IDA, although the IDA later added a further USD 50 million for DDR activities in the DRC.

The MDRP and IDA funds were designed to finance national programmes, while the MDTF budget could also pay for special projects; regional activities; and programme management and monitoring activities.

Special programme implementation units of the national governments were the recipients of MDTF grants and had overall responsibility for the management of national programmes. Partner governments, UN agencies and other organisations and agencies received grants for special projects and managed their implementation. The World Bank was given the lead role in executing regional activities and the overall programme management of the MDTF.<sup>8</sup>

Table 1 below outlines the estimated and actual costs per country and type of activity.

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<sup>7</sup> World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 25, 2002, p18-19.

<sup>8</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p14-16.

**Table 1: MDRP estimated cost and actual disbursement, as of 30 June 2009 <sup>9</sup>**

Country	Estimated Cost	MDTF		IDA	Totals
		Natl Programmes	Special Projects		
Angola	112,500,000	20,711,832	4,245,592	33,691,833	58,649,257
Burundi	90,000,000	29,171,408	3,474,016	29,318,586	61,964,010
CAR	3,000,000	0	9,727,000	0	9,727,000
DRC	120,000,000	90,550,444	33,303,769	96,208,544	225,437,612
ROC	12,000,000	13,298,226	0	0	13,298,226
Namibia	4,500,000	0	0	0	0
Rwanda	52,000,000	13,601,864	0	29,147,689	42,749,689
Uganda	37,500,000	0	4,143,066	0	4,143,066
Zimbabwe	15,000,000	0	0	0	0
Subtotals	446,500,000	167,333,774	54,893,443	188,366,652	410,593,869
Spec projects	37,500,000				
Regional activities	5,500,000	2,362,580			2,362,580
Programme management	8,400,000	24,930,694			24,930,694
Trust Fund admin fee	2,100,000	1,548,098			1,548,098
<b>Totals</b>	<b>500,000,000</b>	<b>250,451,183</b>		<b>191,384,533</b>	<b>439,435,241</b>

*The UK government contributed USD 35 million to the MDRP, which made it the second largest donor after the Netherlands, which contributed more than USD 125 million.<sup>10</sup>*

## 5.2.2 Demobilisation

As the *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation* from June 2010 states, ‘the main achievement for the MDRP as a whole has undoubtedly been the demobilisation of the former combatants.’<sup>11</sup> Although all seven country programmes were designed to undertake demobilisation activities by identifying EXCs and providing them with demobilisation benefits, the actual national programme results vary significantly.

Table 2 shows the numbers of EXCs per country that were demobilised. ‘The degree to which all eligible combatants received full D&R entitlements varied in some countries, especially among the last to be demobilised. The typical reason was that a programme ran out of time and thus had to simplify the support made available by reducing the time provided for training, the range of training opportunities available, or transformed benefits from in-kind to cash payments.’<sup>12</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Sources: Estimated Cost: World Bank, *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 25, 2002; MDRP Secretariat, except for CAR & IDA: MDRP, *Progress Report*, 4th Quarter 2008, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p16.

<sup>10</sup> MDRP, *Quarterly Progress Report*, table 2, Fourth Quarter 2008; MDRP, *Final ICM*, May 2010.

<sup>11</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p27.

<sup>12</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p27-28.



**Table 2: Summary of demobilised EXCs, as of end 2008** <sup>13</sup>

Countries	Targets*	Results	Percentage of achievement
DRC	150,000	102,014	68%
Angola	105,000	97,390	93%
Burundi	55,000	26,283	48%
Central African Rep.	7,565	7,556	100%
Rwanda	36,000	29,764	83%
Republic of Congo	11,000	0	0%
Uganda	15,310	16,256	106%
<b>Total</b>	<b>379,875</b>	<b>279,263</b>	<b>74%</b>

\* The original targets were often based on uncertain guesstimates at the time of the design of the MDRP.

In the DRC, 102,014 EXCs had been demobilised by the end of 2008, as against a target of 150,000. Demobilisation activities were ongoing throughout 2009, to ensure the transfer of EXCs in ongoing socioeconomic reintegration projects by June 2010. The *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme : End of Programme Evaluation* states that ‘the DRC programme has experienced a number of delays due to political and management problems at the national level as well as Government shift in priorities from that of completion of army integration and demobilisation to the conflict in the east (Kivus and Ituri region).’<sup>14</sup> These problems have been described more clearly by a former UN Chief Political Affairs Officer in Bukavu, South Kivu, who stated: ‘The relationship between DRC and World Bank came to a freeze based on the corruption in the Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et Réintégration (CONADER),’ the Congolese Government’s DDR implementation agency.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, the programme received additional funding for the processing of remaining Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) troops and other members of armed groups into integration or demobilisation programmes.<sup>16</sup>

### 5.2.3 Reinsertion and reintegration

In the MDRP, *reinsertion* was a transitional safety net, while *reintegration* was a longer-term process for EXCs and their families to re-enter civilian life and adapt economically.

Table 3 below gives a summary of reinsertion and reintegration activities per country.

<sup>13</sup> Source: MDRP, *Quarterly Progress Report*, October-December 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p28-29.

<sup>15</sup> Anonymous, written answer by former UN Chief Political Affairs Officer in Bukavu, South Kivu, 30 September 2011.

<sup>16</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p28-29.

**Table 3: Summary of reinsertion and reintegration achievements, end 2008** <sup>17</sup>

Countries	Activities	Target	Results	Percentage of achievement
DRC	Reinsertion	120,000	102,014	85%
	Reintegration	90,000	52,172	58%
Angola	Reinsertion	62,716	52,721	84%
	Reintegration	133,662	92,297	69%
Burundi *	Reinsertion	35,000	23,022	42%
	Reintegration	35,000	21,012	38%
Central African Republic	Reinsertion	7,565	7,533	100%
	Reintegration	7,565	7,556	100%
Rwanda	Reinsertion	47,400	44,491	94%
	Reintegration	50,000	43,891	88%
Uganda	Reinsertion	15,310	14,816	97%
	Reintegration	n.a.	n.a.	---
Total	Reinsertion	298,725	244,597	82%
	Reintegration	346,227	232,107	64%

*The figures for Burundi here are not the ones used by MDRP, since they used the original figure of 55,000. In order to be consistent with Table 2, the revised target 35,000 (cited by the Scanteam) is used here, which also affects the totals.*

In the DRC, reinsertion payments were provided to all 102,014 beneficiaries, but as a study undertaken by consultancy firm Ernst and Young observed, the lack of a functioning banking system (cell phones were used to make reinsertion payments) led to many payments being made late.<sup>18</sup> According to a World Bank internal Implementation Completion Memorandum, reintegration assistance was provided to 54% of the demobilised EXCs. In 2007, MDRP and CONADER carried out a beneficiary study, which concluded that once EXCs had been reintegrated in their respective communities, 68% achieved basic self-subsistence.<sup>19</sup> However, these figures have been disputed by the Scanteam evaluators, as the survey was poorly designed and had significant shortcomings.<sup>20</sup> As the *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation* observes,

*The survey did not reach beneficiaries in combat zones or in remote rural areas. It was conducted at a time when only 15,689 had received assistance, and out of 784 reached, only 364 (46%) responded. The validity/reliability of the findings must therefore be seen to be low, since the sample size was small; the selection was far from random; the universe selected from was made up of those who were among the first to be demobilised who on average seem to have received better kits and therefore were more likely to be satisfied; and the low response rate means the self-selection bias is substantial.<sup>21</sup>*

<sup>17</sup> Source: MDRP, *Quarterly Progress Report*, October-December 2008 and Scanteam calculations.

<sup>18</sup> Ernst & Young, *Assessment of the Conader Payment Solution*, July 2006; several sub-reports in French on specific dimensions of the payment system – same date, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme : End of Programme Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p30

<sup>19</sup> MDRP/CONADER, *Sondage sur la Réinsertion des ex-Combattants, République Démocratique du Congo*, Kinshasa, May 2007, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p30.

<sup>20</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p30.

<sup>21</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p134.

#### 5.2.4 Female ex-combatants

The demobilisation of female ex-combatants was a particular focal point for the MDRP. National programmes were required to report in a gender-sensitive fashion and undertake considerable effort to reach female EXCs. As the *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation* states, ‘actual results regarding demobilisation of female EXCs were considered disappointing. A total of just under 10,000 are registered, where the relative *share* of female EXCs varied considerably across countries.’<sup>22</sup>

Table 4 below lists the number of female EXCs demobilised by country.

**Table 4: Female ex-combatants demobilised** <sup>23</sup>

	No of female EXCs	Total no of EXCs	Female EXCs as share of country total
DRC	2 610	102 014	2.6%
Angola	3 338	97 390	3.4%
Burundi	516	26 283	2.0%
CAR	1 176	7 556	15.6%
ROC	2 165	19 588	11.1%
Rwanda	65	29 764	0.2%
Uganda	2 141	16 256	13.2%

#### 5.2.5 Child soldiers

As with female EXCs, the issue of child soldiers was of particular interest to the MDRP. Substantial funds went into releasing children from armed groups and supporting their reinsertion and reintegration. Other projects focused additionally on the prevention of re-recruitment of former child soldiers.

In DRC, there were four special projects which focused on child soldiers. In total they removed over 30,000 child soldiers from armed groups. The children were then passed on to UN agencies or NGOs which were responsible for reintegrating them into civilian life, often by reuniting children with their families.

Table 5 below lists the number of demobilised child soldiers per country.

**Table 5: Child soldiers demobilised** <sup>24</sup>

	Female	Male	Total number
DRC	n.a.	n.a.	30,219
Angola	n.a.	n.a.	13 804
Burundi	49	3,212	3,261
CAR	9	14	23
ROC	n.a.	n.a.	348
Rwanda	2	669	671
Uganda	1,778	3,776	5,554

<sup>22</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p33.

<sup>23</sup> MDRP, *Statistical Progress Report*, table 2, October 2008, p7.

<sup>24</sup> MDRP, *Monthly Progress Report*, table 2, October 2008; MDRP, *Final ICM*, table 10, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p34.

### 5.2.6 Disabled and HIV/Aids-affected ex-combatants

Support to disabled and HIV/Aids-affected EXCs was in most cases very limited. Especially countries with weak resources and institutional structure failed to meet their targets.

In DRC, the number of disabled and war-wounded who received support was very low, largely because the support required by these individuals was beyond the capabilities of the National Programme and therefore most of the EXCs eligible continued to stay in the armed forces. Only 241 out of a targeted 9,000 received support.<sup>25</sup>

Table 6 below lists the number of disabled who received special support by country.

**Table 6: Number of disabled who received special support** <sup>26</sup>

	No of female	Number o male	Total number of disabled supported
DRC	1	241	242
Angola	22	749	771
Burundi	16	1,739	1,755
CAR	0	4	4
ROC	n.a.	n.a.	107
Rwanda	6	9,127	9,135
Uganda	n.a.	n.a.	---

### 5.2.7 Assessment of programme implementation: DRC

DRC had virtually no capacity in place for handling its Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (PNDDR) when it was designed. For this reason, in late 2004, almost one year after the Programme had started, the Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (CONADER) was established to manage the national DDR Programme. The head office was in Kinshasa and ‘CONADER was originally criticised for not being present on the ground where the demobilisation and orientation activities took place. Regional offices were eventually established, though flow of information and management continued to be considered weak.’<sup>27</sup>

CONADER was initially quite successful in setting up a non-falsifiable identity card system, creating a nation-wide database to monitor payments to EXCs, and making sure that the monthly payments during the first year of the reintegration process reached around 100,000 EXCs. Despite some delays, the chosen payment method of using cell phone payment seems to have worked very well.

The international community was aware of the need to support CONADER in its initial set-up, and provided around USD 5 million for training in planning and operational skills. International consultants supported CONADER in many areas, and Germany, France and the USA financed technical experts, as did UNDP on issues relating to gender and reintegration. Furthermore, the MDRP had a pool of experts that supported CONADER on a day-to-day basis. However, this support was met with resistance by Congolese officials. As the *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation* says:

*CONADER staff sidelined and at one point pressured internationals to leave. There was strong resistance to the hiring of the firm for financial management and procurement, which led to months of delays.*

<sup>25</sup> MDRP, *Quarterly Progress Report*, October 2008.

<sup>26</sup> MDRP, *Monthly Statistical Progress Report*, table 4, October 2008, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p35.

<sup>27</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p75.

*The MDRP and [World] Bank also provided training to around 600 local staff, but high staff turn-over and variable training meant Bank procedures were not well understood, so ‘ineligible expenditures’ was supposedly an unknown concept for CONADER staff until the issue came up in connection with the corruption audit. Training in M&E [monitoring and evaluation] and support to develop an M&E unit came quite late in the process.<sup>28</sup>*

The issues described above shed light on the inadequate support to and supervision of CONADER by the international community. Such issues should have been anticipated, and it can be seen as a failure of the World Bank not having put in place adequate programme support for the DRC National Programme. One insider has commented: “Knowing the post-conflict nature of the transitional government, and thereafter the newly elected government, where corruption and nepotism reigned, a more concerted effort should have been made to put in place adequate strategies and resources.”<sup>29</sup>

This notion seems to be shared by the Scanteam evaluators, who stated that ‘given the complexity, risks and challenges associated with working in fragile and conflict-affected environments, and D&R in particular, the World Bank should review its policies, procedures, instruments and staffing in terms of adequacy for operating and administering such ambitious interventions as an MDRP, and in particular has to commit senior management time to such programmes.’<sup>30</sup>

Despite the shortcomings of the World Bank, the main problems with DDR in the DRC were a result of CONADER’s inefficiency. As the *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, carried out by DAI in 2007, put it:

*CONADER performance has been inadequate. There is no proactive analysis of programme gaps or resources needed. Supervision and programme monitoring are weak. The requisite professional capacity to anticipate gaps in agency programming and to harness the energies of disparate actors towards a common work plan subject to shared indicators and evaluation criteria is lacking.<sup>31</sup>*

CONADER, as with many other DRC institutions, was faced with the problem that certain groups within the organisation were loyal to different political movements and were mainly focused on their positioning in the coming elections. Several of these groups were against the DDR programme, because each party aimed to hold on to their military capabilities until the elections had taken place.

This ineffectiveness and mismanagement led to CONADER being replaced in mid-2007 by the Unit for Project Execution (UEP). This smaller body was made up of the most effective staff of CONADER and was given credit for improved planning, monitoring and supervision by the implementation partners in the field. UEP also established a specialist Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Unit, even though this happened rather late in the process.<sup>32</sup>

Once a new government had been elected, it was made clear to the donors that it was now responsible for project implementation. However, the new government had a similarly negative attitude towards the DDR programme as the interim governing coalition. During the fall of 2007, the PNDDR process was largely paralysed. This was mainly due to the government being more concerned with defence reform and integration of combatants into the new armed forces, than with the allocation of DDR resources. Only when the World Bank informed the Congolese Government that the funds for the final implementation phase would be lost, did DDR support grow slightly stronger. While there were issues with the implementation capacity, the major problem was the political commitment to DDR, which often had to be pushed by providing large-scale incentives.<sup>33</sup>

Table 7 below lists the early key performance indicators, while Table 8 summarises the main performance results of the PNDDR (Programme me National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion).

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<sup>28</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p76.

<sup>29</sup> Anonymous, written answer by former UN Chief Political Affairs Officer in Bukavu, South Kivu, 30 September 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p2.

<sup>31</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Final Report, Feb 2007, p4.

<sup>32</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p75-76.

<sup>33</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p66-67.

**Table 7: Key performance indicators (results framework), DRC <sup>34</sup>**

Programme development objectives: assist the recipient in creating long-term sustainable social development and supporting macroeconomic stability in its territory	<p>Indicators:</p> <p>(a) Demobilisation of approximately 150,000 ex-combatants, while providing support for their reinsertion and social and economic reintegration.</p> <p>(b) Contribution to reallocation of recipient's resulting budget savings from defence to social and economic sectors.</p>
Programme phase	Key programme performance indicators
Macro indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 30,000 ex-combatants demobilised by the end of the first year of the project and an additional 80,000 demobilised by the end of second year.</li> <li>- Number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) returned home.</li> <li>- The ratio between social sector expenditures and defence expenditures increases each year of the project from 23% (in 2002).</li> </ul>
General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Timely disbursement of funds.</li> <li>- MIS in place and functional three months after project effectiveness.</li> <li>- An external evaluation of the implementation of the project is carried out annually and includes an analysis of environmental and social monitoring indicators</li> </ul>
Sensitisation and information	- Sensitisation and information tools for EXCs in place in a timely manner and in accordance with PNDDR.
Demobilisation	- Orientation Centres are established according to the timeline in the JOP.
Transition/reinsertion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- First reinsertion payment to all demobilised ex-combatants made upon discharge from demobilisation sites; and second and third reinsertion payments made within three months of their programme end date.</li> <li>- Less than 5% error (double or incorrect payments) made in reinsertion payments.</li> </ul>
Reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 60% of demobilised EXCs engaged in productive economic activities (or schooling) one year after demobilisation.</li> <li>- Active programme for female EXCs within six months of the start of the demobilisation process.</li> <li>- 70% of child soldiers associated with armed groups successfully reintegrated in their chosen reintegration site within 12 months of leaving the transit centres.</li> </ul>

<sup>34</sup> World Bank, *Report T7618-DRC, Technical Annex...to the Democratic Republic of Congo for an Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project*, general text and Table 4 "Key Performance Indicators", 3 May 2004, p36, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p119.

**Table 8: PNDDR results**<sup>35</sup>

Activity/area	Target	Results
Demobilisation of EXCs	150,000	102,012 (99,404 male, 2,610 female)
Reintegration support	90,000	52,172 (58%)
Support and reinsertion of war wounded	9,000	242 (241 male, 1 female)

Peace and stability has improved in the DRC since 2002, but the PNDDR itself has not specified any performance indicators on this dimension. The continued conflict in the eastern parts of the DRC cannot be seen so much as a result of unsuccessful DDR but rather unresolved basic conflicts between some of the key belligerents in the region, just as the successful demobilisation of over 100,000 EXCs cannot be attributed to the PNDDR but rather to the successful political processes that led up to the signing and subsequent implementation of these agreements. At the same time, having the resources to implement the D&R programme was clearly key to moving the overall DDR process forward, and the MDRP was the key to successful funding of the programme.

There was a mid-term review carried out by the MDRP itself, an audit carried out by Ernst and Young on payments and the payments system (Ernst & Young 2006), and a beneficiary survey *Sondage sur la réinsertion des ex-combattants* (MDRP/CONADER 2007), but no independent performance evaluations.<sup>36</sup>

## 6. ASSESSMENT OF SPECIAL DDR PROGRAMME IN THE DRC

In DRC, the MDRP funded the Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (PNDD), as described above, and six special projects:

- i. Prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration of children associated with armed forces (Belgian Red Cross).
- ii. Projects for demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers (NGO Group).
- iii. Support for the reunification and reintegration of former child soldiers in the DRC (Save the Children).
- iv. Prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration (UNICEF).
- v. Rapid reaction mechanism to support DDR of EXCs in the DRC, RRM.
- vi. Community recovery and reintegration of EXCs in eastern DRC, ComRec (both UNDP).

### 6.1. Special project related to child soldiers

Projects (i) to (iv) were special projects designed to deal with the DDR of child soldiers. Their results have been documented in the *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the DRC 2007* and the Scanteam report. An overview over the four special projects related to child soldiers and their objectives and high level results can be found in Tables 8-11 below.

<sup>35</sup> PNDDR, PPP, March 2009; MDRP, *Quarterly Progress Report, October – December 2008*, cited in Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p133.

<sup>36</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation*, Final Report, June 2010, p133.

**Table 8: Summary of objectives of special project related to child soldiers<sup>37</sup>**

Special project	Implementing agency programme objectives
Belgian Red Cross	Training of staff and officials in demobilisation and reintegration (DR), sensitisation and prevention; reintegration activities for 2,400 children.
NGO Group (CARE, IFESH, IRC)	Assess feasibility of children release from armed groups in Maniema (MA), Katanga (KT) and Orientale (OR); community sensitisation and training; develop and implement DR plan for 10,391 children.
Save the Children - UK	Develop / implement strategies to reach girls involved with armed groups; build capacity for government and NGO partners in child protection and child DDR; implement socio-economic reintegration programmes; and strengthen community protection capacities for 4,500 children and 3,500 Other Vulnerable Children (OVC) in South Kivu (SK), North Kivu (NK) and OR.
UNICEF	Assist GoDRC to accelerate implementation and ownership of NDDRP; implement child DDR activities nationwide for 3,000 children (primarily north Equateur (EQ, SK,NK, OR)

**Table 9: Overview of MDRP funding and performance by implementing agencies <sup>38</sup>**

Special project	Budget	Duration & province	Children who have completed the programme	Percentage of target	Children currently in reintegration
Belgian Red Cross	\$2.15 million	May 04 - May 06; Kinshasa & South EQ	101	4.2% of 2,400	195 [8% of 2,400]
NGO Group	\$9.16 million	Apr 03 - Mar 05; OR, MA, KT	273	2.6% of 10,391	5,863 [56% of 10,391]
Save the Children UK	\$5.37 million	June 03 - June 06; OR, SK, NK	230	5.1% of 4,500	3,092 [68% of 4,500]
UNICEF	\$4.99 million	Jan 05 - Jan 07; Nationwide	Not reported		3,361 [112% of 3,000]
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$21.67 million</b>	<b>Concentration in seven provinces</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>2.9% of 20,291</b>	<b>12,511 [61% of 20,291]</b>

*A total number for children associated with fighting forces (CAFF) who have completed the DDR process was not available as of March 2006, because UNICEF did not provide the evaluation team with its beneficiary statistics.*

<sup>37</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p14.

<sup>38</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p15.



**Table 10: Child soldiers demobilisation figures, March 2006** <sup>39</sup>

Children demobilised	Children reunified	Children in reintegration	Children completed programme	Girls	Self-demobilised
21,827	17,305	12,511	605	3,538	2,336

### 6.1.1 (i) Prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration of children (Belgian Red Cross)

**Table 11: Summary of prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration of children (Belgian Red Cross)** <sup>40</sup>

Budget	Duration & province	Programme objectives*	Completed programme	Percentage of target	Currently in reintegration
\$2.15 million	May 04 – May 06; Kinshasa & South Equateur	Training of staff and officials in DR, sensitisation and prevention; reintegration activities for 2,400 children associated with fighting forces (CAFF)	101	4.2% of 2,400	195

\*MDRP registers the BRC target beneficiary number as 800. This is not what BRC signed up for in its IDA grant, the official source of the 2,400 figure used by this evaluation.

#### 6.1.1.1 Objectives

1. *Training of personnel in demobilisation and reintegration activities. Training of 2,000 Red Cross volunteers by 340 ‘communicators’ to work with demobilised child soldiers at transit centres, to mediate with their families and to conduct sensitisation activities at the community level. This training of trainers will cover psycho-social development and counselling of children and child soldiers, mediation techniques and education activities.*
2. *Sensitisation and prevention. Target training groups include government, local authorities, communities, families, teachers and students, Red Cross volunteers. Training will increase understanding of child protection, the situation of child soldiers, their reintegration needs and the associated processes at community level.*
3. *Reintegration of 2,400 child soldiers into families and communities. Transit Centres will be opened along with Transit Family structures, to facilitate care and preparation of children who will stay on average three months before returning to their families and communities. Preparation in these transit care facilities will include psycho-social counselling, skills-oriented training and sports and religious activities. Planning for reintegration activities (school or apprenticeship) and subsequent follow-up visits will begin (once-a-month minimum over one year).*<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p16.

<sup>40</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p55.

<sup>41</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p55.

### 6.1.1.2 Findings

The main findings of the DAI report have been summarised in the Scanteam report and can be found below:

- Only 100 of the 340 communicators and 1,000 out of the 2,000 volunteers received the training outlined in the objectives. Moreover, only 56 of the 100 communicators trained were at the time of the DAI evaluation involved with the programme. However, the evaluation underlined that even if the targets were not reached, the national BRC staff seemed competent, but that this may have been a result of direct involvement in the project rather than due to training received (DAI, pp.56-57).
- Sensitisation and prevention is difficult to evaluate since the impact of such training will only become visible in the long-term and much after the end of the programme. However, the evaluation emphasised that operational details lacked in the project proposal, i.e. clear tasks, exact definitions and work plans (DAI, p. 57).
- Only 553 out of the planned 2,400 children were demobilised (23%), 238 had been reunified with families (9% of target), and a minimal 101 children had completed reintegration (4.2% of 2,400). Planning for this objective was insufficient, including: an underestimation of CAFF to be transferred and their duration in transit care; insufficient logistical capacity in Equateur; limited planning for after reunification.
- The evaluation noted that the Centres for Transit and Orientation (CTOs) were well kept and clean, but this may have been a result of limited occupancy, and that the married couple installed with the CTO worked well. Although there was single sex occupancy, older and younger boys slept in the same rooms and protection against abuse by older boys had not been factored in, this type of abuse has happened elsewhere (DAI, pp. 60-61). A problem was length of stay in CTOs. Some children had been there more than a year, when the objective was three months. Another issue was follow-up for CAFF in rural areas, which was very difficult, some therefore returned to the cities to pursue vocational training since there were not options in their villages for their chosen profession. The BRC had sufficient flexibility for finding solutions for these cases (DAI p. 63). However, there was an urban bias in reintegration activities and rural CAFF did not receive regular follow-up (DAI, p. 65). A primary concern of the evaluation was the BRC's non-systematic integration of self-mobilised in reintegration activities.<sup>42</sup>

### 6.1.2 (ii) Projects for demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers (NGO group) – CARE International, the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Table 12: Project summary projects for demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers (NGO group)<sup>43</sup>

Budget	Duration & province	Programme objectives*	Completed programme	Percentage of target	Currently in reintegration
\$9.16 million	Apr 03 - Mar 05; Orientale (OR), North Katanga (KT) and Maniema (MA) Provinces	Assess feasibility of CAFF release from armed groups in MA, KT and OR; community sensitisation and training; develop and implement DR plan for 10,391 CAFF	273	2.6% of 10,391	5,863

<sup>42</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p135 (note: some grammatical corrections of the text were made by the author).

<sup>43</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p69.

### 6.1.2.1 Objectives

1. *Assess willingness of armed groups to demobilise children. Develop a profile of the situation of child soldiers in or originating from Orientale, North Katanga and Maniema Provinces, and evaluate the good faith of all accessible armed groups to provide access to and develop DDR programmes for these children.*
2. *Community sensitisation and training. Assess the current capacity of families and communities to facilitate the reintegration of children returning from armed groups, and identify and develop potential partners and resources needed for successful reintegration and prevention of recruitment.*
3. *Develop provincial plans for demobilisation and reintegration. Design a comprehensive demobilisation and reintegration (DR) programme for child soldiers in selected provinces within the framework of the national demobilisation and reinsertion programme as it evolves.*
4. *Child soldier reintegration. Implement the comprehensive DR programme in Maniema, Orientale, and North Katanga Provinces, in close collaboration with the national programme, UNICEF and other key actors for a trial implementation period of six months and produce a proposal for a second implementation phase in year two.<sup>44</sup>*

### 6.1.2.2 Findings

The main findings of the DAI report have been summarised in the Scanteam report and can be found below:

- *The NGO group's first objective, profiling armed groups and assessing their willingness to demobilise children, appeared, according to the evaluation, to have achieved its aims (DAI, p. 71). It mapped armed groups and their potential CAFF and led to the publication of a report.*
- *In the project proposal, detailed surveys and mapping were outlined and this was not reflected in the final output. Although very useful insights were garnered from the work undertaken, it was not as in-depth as set out in the objectives (DAI, p. 71).*
- *3,620 [CAFF] had been demobilised of the target of 10,391 at the time of the evaluation, 273 had completed reintegration, 5,836 were in reintegration. The discrepancies between demobilised and in-reintegration were a result of self-demobilised [CAFF]. However, there are unexplained numbers: for example, CARE demobilised 899 CAFF, counted 3,184 in reintegration, hence 2,285 should be self-demobilised, but CARE reported only 1,315 self-demobilised – the discrepancy was not explained (DAI, p. 81). Follow-up on reintegration has not been clear. Overall the NGO group achieved 47% of its goal in relation to children released from armed groups and 56% in relation to children involved in reintegration activities.*
- *Other issues included an over-reliance of MONUC [United Nations Organization Mission to Congo] in relations to logistics, which had a negative impact upon the project when they could no longer assist in this matter. This could have been foreseen during project design (DAI, p. 73). All of the agencies relied on MONUC for air transport, which has been unreliable, resulting in children in transit experiencing long delays waiting more than a year to be reunited with their families.<sup>45</sup>*

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<sup>44</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007 p69-70.

<sup>45</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p135-136 (note: some grammatical corrections of the text were made by the author).

### 6.1.3 (iii) Reunification and reintegration of former child soldiers (Save the Children)

**Table 13: Project summary reunification and reintegration of former child soldiers (Save the Children)<sup>46</sup>**

Budget	Duration & province	Programme objectives*	Completed programme	Percentage of target	Currently in reintegration
\$5.37 million	June 03- June 06; North and South Kivu (NK &SK), and Ituri/Orientale (OR)	Develop and implement strategies to reach girl CAFF; capacity building for government and NGO partners in child protection and child DDR; implement socio-economic reintegration programmes; strengthen community protection capacities for 4,500 CAFF and 3,500 OVC in SK, NK and OR	230	5.1% of 4,500	3,092

#### 6.1.3.1 Objectives

1. *Study and develop strategies to reach girl CAFF. To contribute to an improved understanding of the needs of children associated with the fighting forces - including girls - and to promote their rights during the transition from military to civilian life;*
2. *Strengthen institutional capacity of government and NGO partners to ensure protection of child soldiers within the National DDR Programme (NDDRP). Through a training of trainers programme, to prepare and strengthen the institutional capacity of government and NGO partners to ensure the protection of child soldiers within the NDDRP context;*
3. *Facilitate socio-economic reintegration. To ensure the lasting socio-economic reintegration of 4,500 former child soldiers within their communities through support for their interim care, family reunification and strengthening of community capacity;*
4. *Strengthen community capacities to protect children and ensure the social, economic and educational reintegration of 3,500 vulnerable children. This will involve training and capacity building for local partners and the 11 existing community protection networks and the creation of three more.<sup>47</sup>*

#### 6.1.3.2 Findings

The main findings of the DAI report have been summarised in the Scanteam report and can be found below:

- *In February 2006, 4,580 children had been reunified with their families and 5,902 demobilised, 230 had completed the programme (5.1% of target 4,500) and 3,092 were in reintegration (DAI, p.91 and 97). Therefore 68% of the target was in reintegration in February 2006.*
- *In terms of reaching girl CAFF, the SC-UK [Save the Children UK] published a report on how to deal with girl CAFF which included numerous practical recommendations. The evaluation did not find that there was operational commitment in the project to the implementation of the recommendations and approaches set out in the report (DAI, p. 99). However, it did find that the strategies used to reach girls were in general appropriate (DAI, p. 104).*

<sup>46</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p91.

<sup>47</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p91-92.

- Multiple training programmes were undertaken to ensure capacity building, which was critical for the support and facilitation of the setting-up and implementation of the PNDDR. This activity of the SC-UK Special Project appeared to have been successful, although development of the reintegration module of the training was late (DAI, pp. 104-105).
- An additional key issue was that no specifically targeted approach was tailored to 16-18 year olds, whose needs are entirely different to 8-10 year olds.
- Implementation of activities was delayed, especially concerning follow-up of children in economic or educational reintegration projects.<sup>48</sup>

#### 6.1.4 (iv) Prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration (UNICEF)

**Table 14: Project summary prevention of recruitment, demobilisation and reintegration (UNICEF)** <sup>49</sup>

Budget	Duration & province	Programme objectives*	Completed programme	Percentage of target	Currently in reintegration
\$4.99 million	Jan 05—Jan 07; Nationwide	Assist DRC government to accelerate implementation and ownership of NDDRP; implement child DDR activities nationwide for 3,000 CAFF (primarily in North EQ, SK, NK, OR)	Not reported	Unavailable	3361

##### 6.1.4.1 Objectives

1. Develop and implement the NDDRP for children in close collaboration with the Transition Government;
2. Coordination mechanisms at the national and provincial levels and ensure their implementation;
3. Establish monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the national programme and support their implementation;
4. Train government and NGO personnel in the approach, mechanisms and tools involved in the NDDRP for children;
5. Support projects promoting child reintegration into their families and communities, including the creation of 14 community protection networks;
6. Develop information and sensitisation programmes, and assist their implementation;
7. Enhance national partner capacity, both governmental and nongovernmental, through regular trainings across the country;
8. Establish rapid response mechanisms for the spontaneous demobilisation and reintegration of children from armed forces.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p136.

<sup>49</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p39.

<sup>50</sup> DAI, *Independent Evaluation of Special Projects for Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Report*, Feb 2007, p39-40.

### 6.1.4.2 Findings

The main findings of the DAI report have been summarised in the Scanteam report and can be found below:

- *The objectives of this project were an enormous task. There were some problems with the programme design; there were insufficient UNICEF staff to support local partners; planning for reintegration activities began late; there was no timeline for handover to CONADER, or work plan, this had led to problems of accountability (DAI, pp. 41-42). However, UNICEF successfully finalised the interim child soldier PNDDR.*
- *UNICEF did not provide the DAI evaluation with statistics on demobilisation of child soldiers under the MDRP. It stated that 11,752 had been demobilised, 9,341 reunified and 3,361 (112% of target of 3,000) participating in reintegration activities. However, the evaluation believes this data to be cumulative and includes numbers prior to MDRP funding (DAI, p. 42).*
- *They conducted 32 out of a projected 66 national trainings (UNICEF conducted 17, CONADER 2, SC-UK 13). UNICEF were committed to assist the DRC government in the development of the PNDDR and establishing co-ordination mechanisms at national and provincial level before receiving MDRP funding and did so with MDRP funding. The evaluation concluded that UNICEF provided CONADER with the tools and skills necessary and that UNICEF cannot be blamed for CONADER's inability to reach its objectives, but that CONADER should be held accountable. (DAI, p. 44).*
- *Other issues included; lack of a tailored approach to 16-18 year olds; reintegration follow-up and monitoring was poor, particularly in rural areas; many local partners lacked capacity; and reintegration started late.<sup>51</sup>*

## 6.2 Special projects administered by UNDP

MDRP financed two UNDP special projects, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the Community Recovery and Reintegration Project (ComRec). The results of these two projects are documented in Philip Lancaster, *Preliminary Report on the Evaluation of UNDP-Executed Special Projects Financed Through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund of the MDRP*, 2005 and UNDP, *Case Study, Democratic Republic of Congo, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict Affected Countries*, 2006.

Table 15: UNDP projects summary <sup>52</sup>

Project title	Budget (USD million)
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)	7.3
Community Recovery and Reintegration Project (ComRec)	11.8

### 6.2.1 (v) Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)

#### 6.2.1.1 Objectives

*The RRM constituted an attempt at developing operational procedures designed to respond quickly to opportunities emerging in the field. UNDP created the mechanism in order to fill a gap pending the formulation of a programme me by the Government and the creation of national DDR institutions. The approach proposed under the RRM was an attempt to reconcile the operational requirements of an emergency situation with the institutional processes of a development agency. It called for a three- to five-day lead-time for a decision to*

<sup>51</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p136-137 (note: some grammatical corrections of the text were made by the author).

<sup>52</sup> UNDP, *Case Study, Democratic Republic of Congo, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict Affected Countries*, 2006, p24.

finance a project and a quick disbursement capacity. It relied on a network of partners, mainly NGOs already operational in areas covered by DDR activities.<sup>53</sup>

Specifically, the project objectives were:

1. Respond to programmatic and operational contingencies of the overall DDR process by means of the immediate deployment of human, technical and equipment resources and other inputs;
2. Facilitate the preparation of the national DDR programme through performance of exploratory activities, assessment missions, rapid surveys of the target group and analysis of the prerequisites for successful implementation of the PNDDR.
3. Conduct active peace and reconciliation activities through effective communications strategies.<sup>54</sup>

#### 6.2.1.2 Findings

The main findings of the Lancaster report have been summarised in the Scanteam report and can be found below:

- Broadly the RRM was designed, implemented and managed well, its major weakness was that it depended upon normal UNDP procurement procedures when intending to be a rapid response mechanism (Lancaster, 2005, p. 11 and 12). Normal UNDP procurement procedures slowed down response time.
- The support of the RRM was critical to the development of the PNDDR, where a key contribution was through the provision of funds and expert consultants (Lancaster, p. 18).
- RRM managed on a limited scale to bridge the gap between demobilisation and reintegration by, for example, creating interim employment activities for 3,000 out of 15,000 ex-combatants in Ituri (Lancaster, p. 20). Thus stopping pressure from demobilised soldiers. It has had a significant impact upon communities in all areas (Lancaster, p. 24).
- Proportion of funds committed to the objective of peace and reconciliation through communications strategies was not evident. The impact of RRM is difficult to differentiate from other strategies and casual factors implemented by other actors in the area of peace and reconciliation.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, the UNDP Case Study draws the following conclusions:

Overall, the RRM has significantly helped UNDP assume the more operational role required in a situation of fragile security where opportunities for action have to be seized in a quasi-emergency fashion. Lessons can be learned from the RRM in order to improve the operational efficiency of UNDP and allow the organisation to better match its ambition to develop programmes in conflict and fragile environments with its administrative procedures and institutional culture.<sup>56</sup>

### 6.2.2 Community Recovery and Reintegration (ComRec)

#### 6.2.2.1 Objectives

The strategy, developed via consultations between the country office and the Small Arms and Demobilization Unit of the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), called for linking the traditional UNDP approach to community development and community participation programme with the reintegration of former combatants.<sup>57</sup>

Specifically, the project objectives were:

1. Economic assistance through community projects affecting approximately 20,000 families in the conflict affected regions of eastern DRC;

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<sup>53</sup> UNDP, *Case Study, Democratic Republic of Congo, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict affected Countries*, 2006, p24-25.

<sup>54</sup> Philip Lancaster, *Preliminary report on the evaluation of UNDP-executed special projects financed through the multi-donor trust fund of the MDRP*, 2005, p10.

<sup>55</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p137.

<sup>56</sup> UNDP, *Case Study, Democratic Republic of Congo, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict Affected Countries*, 2006, p25.

<sup>57</sup> UNDP, *Case Study, Democratic Republic of Congo, Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict Affected Countries*, 2006, p25.

2. *Economic and psycho-social assistance to 10,000 ECs in the conflict affected regions of eastern DRC;*
3. *Capacity building assistance to national and local government authorities, especially in the conflict affected regions of eastern DRC.*<sup>58</sup>

### 6.2.2.2 Findings

The main findings of the Lancaster report have been summarised in the Scanteam report and can be found below:

- *ComRec's approach to DDR reflects current thinking on reintegration, however, the preliminary evaluation concluded that the ComRec plan overreached its capacities, and its objectives were not possible within the limited budget and time available (Lancaster, p. 13). Moreover, the implementation strategy was more appropriate to a development project in a peaceful society than one in a (post-)conflict society.*
- *ComRec only placed 83 ex-combatants out of a target of 10,000 in reintegration projects. The preliminary evaluation suggest that this is a result of a passive management, who failed to 'anticipate personnel, training, logistics or financial needs' thus resulting in broken promises to ex-combatants and security incidents due to poor management support (Lancaster, p.19).*
- *Where community projects were implemented for reintegration of ex-combatants, they have had 'a near miraculous' effect (Lancaster, p.19). However, far too few projects were implemented compared to the need and the objectives.*
- *There were long delays between demobilisation and reintegration projects.*
- *Communication lessons learnt (positive and negative) were not applied... thus having a negative impact on the project overall.*
- *The preliminary evaluation states that the human resources management of ComRec was extremely poorly handled and as a consequence crippled performance (Lancaster, p.20).*<sup>59</sup>

## 7. THE TRANSITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME

Following in the footsteps of the MDRP is the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (TDRP). It was established because some of the MDRP partners wanted to maintain a facility that would allow them to meet and exchange on DDR regionally, as well as continue to finance DDR efforts where needed, albeit on a smaller scale than in the MDRP. The TDRP is a three-year programme (2009-2012) financed by a multi-donor trust fund of US\$30.6 million.<sup>60</sup>

The specific programme objectives are:

1. *Provide technical support for the implementation of existing demobilisation and reintegration (D&R) programmes in the Great Lakes region.*
2. *Expand D&R coverage by providing emergency financing for new D&R operations or ongoing programmes with funding gaps;*
3. *Facilitate dialogue, information exchange and learning on D&R to address the regional aspects of conflict, improve the quality of D&R efforts, strengthen co-ordination on policy and programming, and generate lessons for future programmes.*<sup>61</sup>

As the *TDRP Quarterly Report January – March 2011* explains, TDRP continued to provide implementation assistance to the PNDDR in the DRC. At the end of February 2011, a team of the TDRP's Facility for Quality Enhancement and Innovation (FQEI) visited the DRC to finalise a

<sup>58</sup> Philip Lancaster, *Preliminary report on the evaluation of UNDP-executed special projects financed through the multi-donor trust fund of the MDRP*, 2005, p11.

<sup>59</sup> Scanteam, *Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation, Final Report*, June 2010, p138.

<sup>60</sup> [http://www.tdrp.net/en/about\\_us.html](http://www.tdrp.net/en/about_us.html) accessed 05.10.2011.

<sup>61</sup> <http://www.tdrp.net/en/objectives.html> accessed 09.11.2011.



baseline questionnaire and the sampling of 4,200 ex-combatants for a major review of the PNDDR's DDR efforts. The first drafts are expected to be delivered at the end of August 2011 and due to be published in December 2011.<sup>62</sup> The results of this survey may help with the assessment of the longer term performance of the national DDR Programme in the DRC. Furthermore, in late August/early September, the FQEI visited the DRC again to provide technical assistance to the Unité d'Exécution du Projet National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (UEPNDDR) for a variety of end-of-project evaluations (TDRP funding to PNDDR ended on 30 September 2011). Funding to the PNDDR by the African Development Bank will continue until 2013, focusing on support to agricultural reintegration through co-operatives.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>TPRD, *Quarterly Report, Jan-Mar 2007*, p2.

<sup>63</sup>TPRD, *Quarterly Report, July-Sep 2007*.